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America Reborn ?
Conservatives, Liberals, and American Political Culture Since 1945
Nick Salvatore
1 In his widely read 1950 collection of essays, The Liberal Imagination, Lionel Trilling, the
New York intellectual and literary critic, gloried over liberalism’s triumphant place in
postwar American political culture :
n the United States at this time, liberalism is not only the dominant but even the
sole  intellectual  tradition.  For  it  is  the  plain  fact  that  nowadays  there are  no
conservative or reactionary ideas in general  circulation.  This does not mean,  of
course, that there is no impulse to conservatism or to reaction. Such impulses are
certainly  very  strong,  perhaps  even  stronger  than  most  of  us  know.  But  the
conservative impulse and the reactionary impulse do not, with some isolated and
some ecclesiastical exceptions, express themselves in ideas but only in action or in
irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas.
2 Interestingly,  Trilling  expressed  concern  over  the  purported  demise  of  conservative
thought.  Without  an  occasional  bracing  intellectual  critique  from  conservatives,  he
feared that liberalism might flounder, in part because American liberalism was « a large
tendency rather than a concise body of doctrine, » and needed periodic testing it might
not administer itself.1 
3 From the perspective of the early twenty‑first century, we can chide the good professor
for not carefully considering the consequences of what he wished for half a century ago.
For  it  is  clear  that  the  force  of  this  conservative  movement  in  America  was  in  fact
« stronger than most of us [knew] » or could have imagined in 1950, or, indeed, in 1968.
This  conservative  « impulse, »  those  « irritable  mental  gestures, »  has  largely
restructured American political thinking with a force and popular approval that remains
stunning to consider.  The growth of  the conservative movement since 1945 was also
accompanied  by  the  slow  fragmentation  of  liberalism  and,  taken  together,  these
developments raise a fundamental question : Does the New Deal, its policies and its legacy
between 1933 and 1972, constitute the long exception in American political life, as opposed
to the new norm ? In short, was Richard Nixon the last liberal ?
America Reborn ?
Transatlantica, 1 | 2006
1
4 Before I continue, allow me one personal reflection. I have spent the better part of my
professional career writing three books that explored individuals and movements that
sought to redefine the nation’s dominant narrative with a focus on the ideal of social
justice.  In each I  explored a deeply American,  alternative perspective of  the nation’s
history and experience. While what follows in no way negates that work, I do recognize
more sharply here the persistent power of conservative thinking at the core of American
history,  as  I  do  the  seemingly  contradictory  proposition  that  conservatism  was  a
dissenting political movement to the liberalism Trilling so aptly described.
5 Contrary  to  some  current  analysis  that  would  attribute  the  success  of  American
conservatism to the individual genius of a brilliant political strategist (Karl Rove is most
frequently mentioned today), or to the legacy of a genial former actor, Ronald Reagan,
who was  thought  to  have « impersonated »  an American president  in  the  1980s,  the
sources of American conservatism run deep in the nation’s national experience. While
there is not time today to discuss in detail the pre‑1945 experience, it is important to
recall that a pervasive individualism, one that coexisted with deep religious beliefs, a
strong anti‑statist philosophy, and a commitment to freedom for some that demanded
the bondage of others, framed elite thought and popular movements alike in antebellum
America.  Then,  too,  between 1868 and 1928,  with the partial  exceptions of  Theodore
Roosevelt  and  Woodrow  Wilson,  the  sixteen  successful  presidential  candidates,
conservative politicians and mainly Republicans, were fully committed to the system of
industrial capitalism and they all received significant working class support.2
6 But to liberals and conservatives alike in 1945,  the political  landscape appeared very
different.  The  fifteen  year  crisis  of  depression  and  world  war  had  resulted  in  an
unprecedented governmental involvement in American life and liberals largely assumed
that  the  nation  had  experienced  an  irreversible  turning  point.  The  inauguration  of
Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt  in  1933  and  the  stunning  policies  he  introduced  simply
precluded any return, ever, to the policies of Herbert Hoover. Liberals largely opposed
the  Republican,  Dwight  David  Eisenhower  in  the  1952  presidential  election,  but
Roosevelt’s  continued influence,  they thought,  would temper Eisenhower’s policies as
well.3
7 In  1945  conservatives  rather  gloomily  shared  liberals’  perception.  The  state  with  its
centralized planning reigned supreme, they judged ;  and religious values were absent
from  public  life,  particularly  given  the  withdrawal  from public  debate  of  the
Fundamentalist movement in the aftermath of the 1925 Scopes trial. A decidedly secular
liberalism, conservatives decried, one with a very American pragmatic, problem‑solving
approach orchestrated by the state and its bureaucracies, crippled the very notion of
individual liberty. But as would happen repeatedly in the decades to come, what liberals
saw as the finale to conservatism’s role as a political movement, conservatives themselves
saw  as  but  the  end  of  the  first  act  in  a  much  longer  performance.  They  were
self‑conscious dissenters from the liberal norm who rejected the twelve years of New Deal
dominance. They were dissenters on behalf of tradition, and not, as a liberal might put it,
of progressive change, and they sought to preserve and revitalize what they thought
Roosevelt had overturned.
8 At first, this dissenting conservative movement consisted of a small group of intellectuals
attracted to the ideas of two Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrick Hayek.
Spurred especially by Hayek’s 1944 publication,  The Road to  Serfdom,  they condemned
contemporary liberalism in light of a nineteenth‑century classical liberalism as reflected
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in  the  writings  of  Adam Smith,  Edmund Burke,  Lord Acton,  and others.  The central
insight of this libertarian wing of the modern American conservative movement can be
expressed  succinctly :  Centralized  state  planning,  bureaucratic  organization  and
regulation, and other intrusions of government into the lives of individuals and their
families  constituted a full‑scale attack on the very concept  of  human liberty.  As  the
economist Milton Friedman, in the 1940s a young devotee of this movement, wrote in
1962,  economic  freedom  « is  itself  a  component  of  freedom  broadly  understood,  so
economic freedom is an end in itself. » And, he continued, « economic freedom is also an
indispensable  means  toward  the  achievement  of  political  freedom. »  In  time  that
formulation, which grounded America’s very idea of political liberty in the vitality of an
unfettered  free‑market  capitalism,  would  resonate  deeply  among  Americans  of  all
conditions who would vote for candidates who promised, in one manner or another, to
dismantle the New Deal legacy.4
9 Before  long,  another  conservative  intellectual  voice  emerged  to  contest  these
conservative libertarians. Many, but not all, of these intellectuals were born Catholic or
converted  to  that  religion  and  found,  as  Patrick  Allitt  has  suggested,  « a  special
congruence  between  Catholicism  and  political  conservatism. »  Like  the  conservative
libertarians, they too were horrified at the descent into barbarism that World War II
signified,  which  they  partially  attributed  to  the  state’s  undermining  of  individual
freedom. They also emphasized even more strongly liberalism’s sweeping dismissal of
traditional moral concepts as guides to public life and policy. Their view of human nature,
the diametrical opposite of liberalism’s, underscored the centrality of evil and demanded,
that the theological concept of original sin anchor American approaches to both public
policy and private conduct. Nor were these thinkers averse to employing the coercive
power of the central state to restructure society in accord with their moral precepts.
Mass culture in liberal society, Richard Weaver, Russell Kirk, and others proclaimed, was
anathema, a biblical monstrosity on the level of Sodom and Gomorrah, and traditional
American  religious  values  so  scorned  by  liberalism—demanded  a  reconstitution  of
American moral and cultural life. This predominantly Catholic group found a welcome
ally  in  the  emergence of  Billy  Graham,  a  Protestant  fundamentalist  preacher,  whose
condemnation of American popular culture during his massive, eight‑week revival in fall
1949 in Los Angeles—the very center of production for that culture—propelled him to
national fame and enormous influence. Not insignificantly, Graham also emphasized in
his sermons an apocalyptical vision of the global conflict between western civilization
and  a  communism  he  proclaimed  was  « a  religion  that  is  inspired,  directed,  and
motivated by the Devil himself. » Those « ecclesiastical exceptions » Lionel Trilling would
so quickly  dismiss  a  year  later  were,  in  fact,  once again gathering their  strength as
Fundamentalists  and  Pentecostals  alike  returned,  slowly  but  surely,  into  the  public
square.5
10 The strains between these two conservative approaches were obvious in the 1950s, yet
they never split the conservative movement, thanks in part to William F. Buckley. In 1955
he founded National Review, a conservative journal of politics and opinion that quickly
assumed, under his incisive, even acerbic, editorial voice, a leading role in bridging these
differences by repeatedly reminding each side of their common enemy. The Review also
expanded the conservative base, perhaps especially among youth. As Patrick Buchanan,
the quixotic American conservative, recalled of his youthful political awakening in the
late 1950s : « It is difficult to exaggerate the debt conservatives of my generation owe
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National Review and Bill Buckley F05B…F05D For us, what National Review did was to take the
word conservatism, then a synonym for stuffy orthodoxy, Republican stand‑pat‑ism and
economic self‑interest, and convert it into the snapping pennant of a fighting faith. » But
as successful as it was, Buckley’s magazine alone was not responsible for conservatism’s
growing influence in communities across the nation. How did the dissenting thoughts of a
small  group  of  intellectuals,  themselves  not  unified,  evolve  into  a  broad  popular
movement ?6
11 Anti‑Communism was one major motivation that attracted Americans to conservatism.
The perceived threat of the Soviet Union in a world newly fraught with nuclear danger
greatly encouraged the spread of apocalyptical imagery to describe the inevitable final
battle. A corollary concern over the imagined legions of domestic agents of communism
working to  transform America  brought  the  issue  home even more  concretely.  For  a
people raised on the famous dictum that « government is best that governs least, » this
was a threat to the very idea of America. For some, global and local concerns merged.
Descendants of European immigrants, for example, themselves native‑born members of
the working and middle classes, concentrated in the urban North, and often practicing
Catholics,  watched  in  growing  horror  as  the  « Iron  Curtain »  securely  encompassed
nations that still held relatives or, even more gripping to the imagination, the familial
memories of lands they had never visited and now, perhaps, never could. They brought
these cultural and political beliefs into their work places, their trade unions, and their
politics.
12 Given these currents in American political life, it was not surprising that liberal foreign
policy, most famously associated with George Kennan, came under fierce attack. Kennan
sought the containment of Soviet territorial expansion and geo‑political influence. To
conservatives, however, this required a policy of co‑existence with communism, and not
its elimination ; committed anti‑communists understood this as an immoral compromise
with evil itself, tantamount to treason. Liberals, conservatives now suggested, were found
wanting when the defense of the nation was at stake. Some went further. Liberal support
of centralized planning and bureaucratic problem solving, without public reference to
transcendent religious values, encouraged conservative activists as well as intellectuals to
depict  liberals  as  advocates  of  a  philosophy  that  constituted  the  essential  first  step
toward communism. What made this plausible for many so soon following Roosevelt’s
successful defense of the nation during the 1940s was the changed nature of the enemy.
Fascism  was  no  longer  a  concern,  and  the  repeated  « red  scares »  that  unearthed
purported communist agents in sensitive government positions reinforced the belief that
liberalism  was  but  a  forerunner  of  communism.  That  many  of  these  anti‑statist
conservatives themselves benefited, directly and indirectly, from the expanding public
sector of federal bureaucracy—through grants, contracts, and employment—was an irony
few wished to discuss.7
13 Liberals were generally quick to dismiss this anti‑communism with a glib reference to the
bizarre claims of Robert Welch, his John Birch Society, and other practitioners of what
historian Richard Hofstadter once called « the paranoid style » in American politics.8 But,
as Lisa McGirr’s  fine study of  conservatism in southern California,  Suburban Warriors,
indicates, it was local efforts that proved most important. Spurred by anti‑communism
and  the  related  concern  that  God  had  no  place  in  the  dominant  American  culture,
conservative  activists  organized  locally  to  achieve  certain  goals :  concerned  women,
many never before involved in politics, gathered in small groups (coffee‑klatches, in the
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language of suburban America) in their homes to discuss political ideas and their local
impact, often organized by a neighbor who was herself newly active in the movement ;
conservative men and women worked to oust  liberals  who opposed prayer  in public
schools from all local political offices ; and growing numbers of church‑based discussion
groups explored the biblical imperative to resist secular culture. These men and women
created a densely layered network of local activists who gathered across the nation to
publicly affirm the introduction of the phrase, « under God, » in the Pledge of Allegiance
recited  daily  by  public  school  children ;  to  condemn,  as  an  unwarranted  and
unconstitutional intrusion by government in their individual lives, the 1962 United States
Supreme Court’s decision banning prayer in those same public schools ; and to demand
that the power of the same central government outlaw abortion. Liberal intellectuals
could well deride the contradictory principles at work in these stances, but Lisa McGirr
was also accurate when she suggested that, to these activists, the conflicting approaches
nonetheless made a « common sense. »9
14 The ideology of anti‑statism had a second major impact on political life in these years
when it forcefully reappeared as states’ rights, an enormously popular political call to
arms to defend against perceived federal  intrusion in local  or state affairs.  That this
phrase, saturated with John C. Calhoun’s historic antebellum defense of slavery, was as
well a call to defend a segregated America was not accidental. Decisions of the Supreme
Court during the 1940s had weakened some state laws that prevented African Americans
from voting ; the historic Brown decision in 1954 declared unconstitutional the policy of
separate  but  equal ;  and  in  1957,  Eisenhower  sent  in  federal  troops  to  force  the
integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Yet, even before Brown, the
approval  of  a  civil  rights  plank in the 1948 national  Democratic  convention led to a
walkout  of  many  southern  delegates led  by  the  then  Democratic  governor  of  South
Carolina, Strom Thurmond. Under the banner of the States’ Rights Party, he ran for the
presidency in 1948 and, in an American South where the Democratic party had dominated
since 1876,  as  it  proudly  and publicly  proclaimed itself  the party  of  the white  man,
Thurmond won majorities in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. This
was indeed a harbinger of things to come.10
15 Ideas were important but, like all political movements, conservatives also desired power,
and they never assumed their current minority status was permanent. During the 1950s
they began a concerted effort to gain control of the Republican party, which was then
considerably more liberal. In a local community or on a college campus, it seemed, there
was no office too insignificant that did not have a conservative candidate in the race. At
the 1960 Republican presidential convention, conservatives, who always thought Richard
Nixon  was  too  liberal,  worked  to  gain  the  vice‑presidential  nomination  for  Barry
Goldwater, the senator from Arizona. In this they failed, but never stopped organizing. In
September 1961, some 100 college students, representing campuses across the country,
met  at  William F.  Buckley’s  estate  in  Connecticut  and  formed  Young  Americans  for
Freedom. Two years later, conservative young Republicans, with the assistance of some
very astute older  political  activists,  gained control  of  the National  Republican Youth
Committee. In 1964 the conservative movement won control of the Republican party,
nominated Barry Goldwater, and, after an exhausting effort, watched in some grief as
Lyndon Baines Johnson overwhelmed Goldwater in the November election. That same
year, however, at a time when the total membership of the emerging New Left’s major
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organization,  Students  for  a  Democratic  Society,  had  approximately  1,500  members,
Young American for Freedom added 5,400 new members.11
16 Once again conservatives reacted to a major defeat as if it were but one more act in a long
and complex play. They continued to grow locally even as they suffered disappointments
at the national level (Richard Nixon, in 1968, was again not their top choice), and gave
further evidence of creating an alternative institutional culture that reflected their ideas
and values. It was during the 1960s and 1970s that Christian schools, usually formed to
avoid desegregation orders, strongly emerged as a conservative option, as did the home
schooling movement. At the same time, conservative and/or Christian bookstores and
speakers’ bureaus supplied local study groups and audiences with scathing appraisals of
student protestors, civil rights activity, and the feminist movement. This political faith, in
light  of  Goldwater’s  defeat,  was  anything  but  an  unthinking  reflex  born  of
disappointment. The conservative vision that projected the belief that the basic struggle
was  for  the  very  soul  of  America  also  grasped,  in  the  wreckage  of  the  Goldwater
campaign, two quite pragmatic lessons.
17 The first directed attention to what Goldwater, an uncompromising conservative, had
achieved. More than 27 million Americans had voted for him, and he carried the electoral
votes of six states : Arizona, his home state, and Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina—Strom Thurmond’s four from 1948, plus Georgia. Moreover, seven
Republican congressmen were elected from the South where, before the election, there
had been no southern Republicans in the House of Representatives. Coupled with the
appeal  of  the Democratic  segregationist  governor of  Alabama,  George Corey Wallace,
whose campaign in his party’s 1964 presidential primaries revealed surprising strength
outside the South,  Republican conservatives recognized that,  by appealing directly to
white voters on the basis of states’ rights, a moral and fiscal conservatism, and near open
disdain for the civil rights movement, they could win white voters away from the New
Deal electoral coalition. If successful, this would weaken the Democratic party at every
level  and,  simultaneously,  complete  the  transformation  of  the  Republican  party  by
defeating all but a few stragglers from the liberal wing. This, in turn, set the foundation
for a broader conservative reorientation of national political debate. In essence, this was
the core of Kevin Phillip’s « Southern strategy, » which he organized for Richard Nixon in
the 1968 campaign.12
18 The  second  lesson  learned  from  1964  was  the  recognition  that,  in  Ronald  Reagan,
conservatives had a political talent of extraordinary ability to articulate the conservative
cause. He was less acerbic than Bill Buckley, less rigid than Barry Goldwater, less vitriolic
than George Wallace, but Reagan was able to successfully present the core values of the
movement to ever wider audiences. His nationally televised speech for Goldwater toward
the end of the campaign could not save Goldwater’s candidacy, but it provided Reagan
with one.  He ran successfully  for  governor of  California  in 1966,  on a  platform that
opposed  civil  rights  legislation  in  housing  and  employment ;  attacked  student
demonstrators, particularly at the University of California at Berkeley, for their lack of
patriotism  and  their  culture  of  « filthy  speech »  and  free  love ;  and  promised  an
administration of fiscal conservatism and lower taxes. Reelected in 1970, he was by then a
major presence in the Republican party who, of course, won election to the presidency in
1980. It was in that 1980 election that Philip’s strategy proved successful nationally, with
the emergence of the so‑called Reagan Democrats—white, northern, urban working men
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and women, many third generation members of the New Deal coalition, who voted for
Reagan in significant numbers.13
19 There was one additional event of great consequence for American politics that no one
could have foreseen. In 1973, in a landmark decision known as Roe v. Wade, the United
States Supreme Court legalized abortion. As conservatives recovered from the shock of
that decision, their fury at yet another major intrusion by the central state generated a
powerful  organizing  campaign.  National  organizations  rededicated  their  efforts,  new
groups appeared, and, in local communities across the nation, individuals gathered with
neighbors, friends, and fellow church members to plan public responses. The growing
political presence of the church community had been evident for some time, but the
reaction to Roe completed a major transition among Fundamentalists in understanding
the relation between their faith and political action. In a 1979 sermon, Reverend Jerry
Falwell, pastor of the Thomas Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Virginia and a leading
Fundamentalist preacher,  forcefully preached that Fundamentalists must reform their
traditional separatist attitude toward the world. « [W]e have to rebuild a nation, » he
preached, « …[for] the fact is, you cannot separate the sacred and the secular. » This was a
startling change for Falwell’s born‑again followers. The task of the religious school was
not simply to train ministers, he continued, but « to train men of God » to enter politics,
medicine, business, and other professions. « If we are to turn this country around, » he
preached, with Roe and the battle concerning the legal status of women over the Equal
Rights  Amendment  in  his  audience’s  consciousness,  « we  have  to  get  God’s  people
mobilized in the right direction and we must do it quickly. » Falwell was an important
figure in bringing fundamentalists into the world of politics, and he also helped them
bridge the deep chasm that existed between them and the more charismatic Pentecostals.
It  was  this  sea‑change  of  theological  and  fraternal  understanding  that  allowed  the
creation of  the Moral  Majority  in 1979,  perhaps the most  effective religiously‑based,
conservative political group in the two decades following its founding. In a society where,
in 1976, 34 percent of adult Americans reported themselves as born‑again Christians, this
was of enormous significance. Ironically, as Falwell substantially aided in the creation of
Reagan Democrats, he did so in the soaring tones of an evangelical tradition that Charles
Grandison Finney had used to oppose slavery in the 1830s and which, more recently, had
been the core of the belief system that propelled the southern Civil Rights movement.14
20 The results of this conservative effort have been astounding. Between 1968 and 2004,
seven of the ten presidential elections have sent increasingly conservative Republicans to
the White House ; and the two Democrats elected, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, grew
ever more distant from the New Deal and its legacy. The Congress became Republican,
and the conservative beliefs of congressional Republicans intensified dramatically. How
did liberalism,  apparently  reigning supreme in  1945,  falter  so  profoundly  before  the
growth of this conservative movement ?15
21 Some argue that the answer lies in a series of strategic errors in the past : The widespread
liberal  conceit  that  the  1925  Scopes  trial  signaled  the  irreversible  decline  of
fundamentalism.  Others  emphasized  1964, when liberal  political  wisdom dismissively
rejected Goldwater’s  politics  as  beneath analysis.  As the historian Richard Hofstadter
asked of the conservative candidate who would win 27 million votes that year, « When, in
all  our history,  had anyone with ideas so bizarre,  so archaic,  so self‑confounding,  so
remote  from the  basic  American consensus,  ever  got  so  far ? »  Some pointed to  the
reaction to Roe v. Wade in 1973, which many liberals again thought settled another major
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religio‑cultural issue, abortion. The elections of 2000 and 2004 also came under scrutiny,
and many felt that a mistake here,  a lack of focus there,  might have produced quite
different results. But none of these approaches address the one question symbolic of the
changes in American political  culture since 1945 :  In the 1984 presidential  campaign,
when Ronald Reagan stood for reelection against Walter Mondale, the quintessential New
Deal legacy Democrat,  how did Reagan’s frontal attack on the Air Traffic Controllers’
Union in 1981, his hostile attitudes toward unions in general, and his economic policies
which benefited the wealthy, encourage 46 percent of voters in trade union families to
support his reelection ?16
22 This  question  raises  the  possibility  that  the  New  Deal  and  its  legacy  was,  in  fact,
something of « the long exception » in American political life, and not the major step in
the inevitable growth of a progressive liberal politics. I recognize that this inversion of
traditional liberal conceptions about American exceptionalism, about being « born free »
as Louis Hartz proclaimed, requires a more thorough analysis of political thought, to say
nothing of social and cultural change, than I can present today. But I offer this as a start.
23 Twenty years before Lionel Trilling expressed concern that liberalism lacked « a concise
body of doctrine, » John Dewey, the pragmatic philosopher and left‑leaning liberal, posed
the question in a more fundamental fashion. Dewey argued, in Individualism Old and New,
for a reconfigured liberalism, one that proclaimed the centrality of democratic debate
and decision‑making in social life, and ground itself in a new concept of individualism
that  derived  its  vitality  from  the  collective  and  individual  values  imbedded  in  that
broader, democratic process. Obsolete and detrimental in an era of corporate capitalism,
Dewey  argued,  was  the  atomistic  individualism  of  nineteenth‑century  classical
liberalism ;  but  detrimental  too  was  the  embrace  of  bureaucratic  organization  and
centralized planning implemented by liberal and/or left « experts » who largely ruled
apart from the people whose lives their decisions altered. Beyond problem‑solving by
educated  elites  versed  in  the  technology  of  management,  Dewey  asked,  what  did
liberalism  offer ?  His  answer  was  not  comforting :  The  « lack  of  secure  objects  of
allegiance, without which individuals are lost,  is especially striking in the case of the
liberal. » Liberalism had had in the past « a definite intellectual creed » that marked it
from conservatism, he wrote in 1930, but perhaps no longer : « Liberalism to‑day is hardly
more than a temper of mind, vaguely called forward‑looking, but quite uncertain as to
where to look and what to look forward to. » For a political movement, Dewey considered
this a tragedy, « For human nature is self‑possessed only as it has objects to which it can
attach itself. » Dewey’s solution to what the first George Bush would famously call « the
vision thing » was not religion. Rather, he thought that such an allegiance could only
develop  through  the  democratic  control  « of  the  science  and  technology  that  have
mastered the physical forces of nature. »17
24 Liberalism grasped the control of science and technology, but was less enamored of either
democratic decision‑making or a new individualism. In part, Roosevelt’s astute genius in
articulating  his  goals  (including  the  preservation  corporate  capitalism  and  its
non‑democratic governance) utilized a political rhetoric steeped in the mythic images of
the traditional American narrative, which extolled a pre‑industrial ideology of individual
effort  and  will  as  the  cornerstone  of  opportunity  and  social  mobility.  Upon  this
foundation FDR constructed an electoral coalition of social groups with disparate, even
antagonistic,  interests.  So  deep  was  the  crisis  that  Roosevelt  was  able  to  present
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problem‑solving as the tool to fulfill the historic American mission, and to that extent he
presented to Americans a compelling vision for their allegiance. But this would not last.18
25 The fissures  in  that  coalition were immediately  evident.  Roosevelt’s  influence in  the
Congress  depended upon a  shaky  alliance  between conservative  southern Democrats
defending  their  segregationist  culture  and  low‑wage,  non‑union  labor  force,  and
northern Democrats increasingly supportive of civil rights and labor legislation. Given
the power of southern Democrats to block New Deal legislation, FDR carefully avoided
references to racial issues in most of his talks to the nation. Roosevelt understood this
political imbroglio even before he took office, remarking in 1932 of the conservatives in
his party, that by 1940 « we might not any longer have a Democratic party ; but we will
have a Progressive one. » In 1938 FDR took a dramatic step toward reorganizing political
parties by ideology when he declared the right to endorse one Democratic candidate over
another in the primaries based on their commitment to progressive liberalism. Yet the
realignment Roosevelt desired never materialized. Indeed, at his death in 1945, Lawrence
and  Cornelia  Levine  have  written,  « the  greatest  irony »  was  that  the  New  Deal
Democratic  coalition remained « as  inherently  unstable  and prone to  ideological  and
political  stalemate as  the day Roosevelt  became its  leader. »  Three years later,  when
Henry Wallace sought to implement his version of FDR’s Progressive party, even Strom
Thurmond’s limited success far outdistanced Wallace’s results.19
26 What held the coalition together into the 1950s was what might be called class politics. It
was not that FDR dabbled in socialism—he told the nation in 1936 that « Labor Day in this
country has never been a class holiday. It has always been a national holiday »20—but
rather that the New Deal’s programs extended significant help to those in need. Yet, even
during the 1930s, this liberal appeal lacked a core vision that transcended immediate
issues. A letter from Mrs. H. A. Thompson, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, written to FDR on April
29, 1935—one of more than 15 million letters written by Americans to FDR during his long
term as president—is worth examining in this context, even though one letter culled from
so many cannot be called representative.
27 Mrs. Thompson did not give either her or her husband’s occupation, but it was clear from
her letter that the Depression had taken its toll on her family. She reported that she had
worn but one house dress for the last three years, and that the family was in desperate
need of bedding, clothes, rugs, and other household goods. She and her husband had
listened to FDR’s defense of his policies on the radio the night before,  and generally
approved. But, Mrs. Thompson suggested, she had some comments. New Deal programs
had been « more than generous in taking care of the unemployed, » she began, « and
there are many in the lower class of people also some of the colored ones, who think they
should have more. Dear Sir, » she continued, warming to the core of her thinking, « they
have more than any working man who works every day but does not get enough only to
pay his bills and nothing left to buy things we need so badly. » Having separated herself
and her  husband from those she deemed among the undeserving—those who lacked
individual initiative, those who were African American—Mrs. Thompson concluded with a
vivid sentence that conveyed another deeply held conviction : « Employers just want to
pocket the money and make one work for a pittance. »21
28 Mrs. Thompson’s letter is helpful in understanding the depth of the belief patterns that
would  inform  conservative,  populist  critiques  of  American  liberalism  after  the  war.
Employers, the undeserving poor, blacks—these were the groups she mentioned when the
New  Deal’s  programs  still  held  her  broad  allegiance.  In  the  decades  that  followed,
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opposition to government involvement, particularly in the context of a rising economic
well‑being, proved attractive to many.
29 The New Deal liberalism captured in that phrase, class politics, never became the central
vision  for  a  significant  segment  of  Americans.  Following  FDR’s  death,  one  political
supporter warned Eleanor Roosevelt that in the South « a general retreat » from « the
forward‑looking policies of the new deal » was already in progress. But the retreat, as
James  Dombrowski  called  it,  was  not  a  withdrawal  from  a  position  once  held
unambiguously. Rather, the meaning of individualism, the importance of religious faith,
the imbedded values associated with racial difference, an anger at the devaluing of civic
worth in a society regulated by giant governmental and corporate bureaucracies—these
issues never found a comfortable home in liberalism as it was experienced by many. It is
here, in this rugged terrain with intense personal and public meaning, that progressive
liberalism’s fate as the « long exception » in American political life must be explored.22 
30 Liberalism has rightly been applauded for its efforts to unionize a broad group of workers
during the 1930s, most notably into the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the CIO.
Some activists then and many historians since have considered these CIO members as
integral parts of that progressive liberal coalition, as in some ways they were. Yet, these
men and women were always more complex than a singular focus on their union activity
might suggest.  Satisfactory figures are hard to obtain,  but  the most  careful  estimate
suggests that 30 percent of CIO members were ethnic Catholics, and perhaps 40 percent
occupied  leadership  positions  in  local  and  state  union  organizations.  In  addition,  of
course,  Philip  Murray,  who succeeded John L.  Lewis  as  CIO president,  was  a  devout
Catholic, as were others in the national CIO leadership. Leaders and members alike could
be practicing Catholics and militant unionists, but what they meant by liberalism often
differed greatly from the thinking of the college‑educated men and women who staffed
the New Deal agencies in Washington.23
31 Catholic  industrial  workers  in the 1930s  and 1940s  had largely been raised in urban
enclaves  bound  by  ethnic  loyalties  that  were  yet  powerful,  and  by  a religious  faith
intensely  critical  of  individualism,  modernity,  and  liberalism.  The  parish  priest,  the
immediate point of  authority,  usually preached obedience to God and considered the
claim of mankind’s mastery « of the physical forces of nature » blasphemous. The parish
community in which workers lived, with the physical church at its center, was the site of
their profession of faith, of the education of their children, and of much of their family’s
social life. To be a practicing Catholic at this time could involve, simultaneously, a defense
of  unionism as  reflected in papal  encyclicals,  a  total  opposition to birth control  and
euthanasia,  and a  commitment  to  follow the  church’s  censorship  of  popular  culture
deemed immoral. As Michael Curley, the archbishop of Baltimore, a largely working class
and heavily  ethnic  Catholic  city,  from 1921 to 1947,  expressed it,  he believed in the
« Catholic  Ghetto, »  in  developing  self‑sufficiency  within  the  parameters  of  Catholic
institutions,  and  rejected  individualism  and  what  he  termed  « forceful,  improper
Americanization. » Catholics, the American church proclaimed repeatedly through the
1950s, lived in a community where their religious values gave meaning and direction to
their individual lives.24 
32 As  would  become  clear  in  the  1940s  and  1950s,  moreover,  Catholic  opposition  to
communism never shared the same root meanings with liberal anti‑communism. On May
1, 1947, some 50,000 Catholics, working people and trade unionists included, crowded into
Baltimore’s Memorial Stadium to pray for the conversion of Russia from communism to
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Christianity.  A  local  bishop  made  two  central  points.  Catholics,  Lawrence  Shehan
cautioned, should not attack the Russian people, for they have been manipulated by a
very small  group of leaders.  His second point revealed the unfathomable chasm with
liberal  anti‑communism :  « [T]his  country  and  every  country  in  the  world, »  Shehan
insisted, « needs a reconversion to God. As individuals and as a nation we have often
wandered from God’s law. » To the extent that Catholic working people absorbed these
ideas (and there is much evidence to suggest many did), any similarity between their
vision and that of progressive liberalism remained accidental.25
33 Nor was  this  faith‑based tension with liberalism just  a  Catholic  response.  Protestant
evangelist Billy Graham would have been quite comfortable with Bishop Shehan’s words,
and the call to revival echoed as well among working people, the majority of whom were
Protestant. Protestants and Catholics had their sharp tensions, but they would discover
that growing numbers of them shared a critique of modernism, mass culture, and the
underlying  assumptions  of  progressive  liberalism.  Among  them  were  many  union
members, and even more unorganized working people.26
34 On matters of race as well, the rhetoric of progressive liberalism remained alien to many
who benefited from its programs. As the letter from Iowa’s Mrs. Thompson suggests, this
was  not  simply  a  southern problem.  In  the  height  of  the  New Deal,  white  northern
working people frequently battled African Americans to prevent integration of desirable
jobs. « Hate strikes »—where white union members walked off the job to protest working
with black union workers—occurred throughout industrial life, and in quite progressive
unions. In time, white workers made an accommodation on the job, but fiercely resisted
black efforts for additional housing. In Detroit, Chicago, New York, and elsewhere, whites
defended the racial purity of their neighborhoods with political power, mob action, and
violence. Frequently, white neighborhood groups organized and held planning meetings
in the social rooms of their local parish churches. Here then was another nexus of belief
that marked its adherents as apart from progressive liberalism. That many thought they
were defending their home, the one financial investment a working man might possess,
and  their  neighborhood in  the  face  of  liberal  criticism of  their  racism was  perhaps
poignant, but only underscored the narrowed political limits liberalism could successfully
engage. It also had another consequence. Many white union members blamed communist
or liberal organizers within unions for raising the issue of black equality. This quickly
sharpened the  anti‑elitism already evident  among workers.  As  one nationally‑known
Catholic priest wrote in 1944, before communist sympathizers infiltrated the union local,
they  « had  rarely  lifted  anything  heavier  than a  pen. »  Long  after  communism as  a
domestic issue had receded,  the image of educated,  liberal  elites imposing social  and
cultural policy on others remained the dominant motif of a potent conservative populism.
27
35 The  postwar  conservative  ascendancy,  then,  was  not  accidental.  The  conservative
movement found those « secure objects of allegiance » that John Dewey recognized as
critical, and grounded that broader vision in traditional concepts of individualism and
patriotism ;  in deeply‑held,  public  expressions of  religious faith ;  and in a race‑based
appeal,  well  into the 1980s,  to white voters to leave the Democratic party.  It  is most
interesting that, in its populist outreach, conservatism has recently sought to include
African  Americans  and  Hispanics  as  allies  and  potential  voters.  If  the  conservative
political base can avoid alienating voters with its millennial rhetoric, and if the approach
to minorities, more successful with Hispanics than blacks in 2004, does make significant
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electoral inroads, the conservative dominance of American political life may stretch even
beyond the horizon.
36 Liberalism, meanwhile, remains largely in turmoil, as neither Dewey’s emphasis on the
control of nature, nor any other approach, has provided it with a compelling structure of
belief. Of all the liberal postmortems on the 2004 election, one struck me as particularly
poignant. ZZ Packer, an African American woman raised in a black evangelical church
community  and  a  committed  Democratic  liberal,  addressed  the  need  for  liberals  to
recognize  the  power  of  faith‑based  activists  even  in  their  own  party.
Religiously‑orientated  Democrats  could  reach  those  moderate  Christian  evangelicals
attracted to conservatism’s moral appeal, but offended by the political implementation.
Impressed  by  party  strategist  James  Carville’s  comment  that  the  party  of  liberalism
possessed « litanies, not a narrative, » Packer argued that the Democratic vision never
transcended a list of single issue policies representing specific interest‑group positions.
« The  problem, »  she  suggested,  « is  that  a  single  issue  is  a  single  thread,  and  the
Republicans have proved adept at snipping it with the sharp scissors of ‘values.’ »28
37 In her efforts to call her fellow liberals back from the precipice inherent in « their deep
ingrained assumption that  human rationality  will  win the day over  human nature, »
Packer echoed a nineteenth‑century American effort to better integrate these dimensions
of human experience. In 1870, John Humphrey Noyes, a participant in and historian of the
American utopian socialist movement, wrote that the successful socialist communities
were those that centered their socialism in a strong religious faith. Despite the sharp
differences between the two movements—the one « of Bible men, and the other of infidels
and liberals, » he wrote—Noyes thought the two movements deeply interdependent for
they complemented the other’s  shortcomings :  evangelical  religious  enthusiasts  often
failed  in  their  engagement  with  society’s  problems ;  socialists  in  understanding  the
importance of the « regeneration of the heart. »29 
38 Operating as it must in a political culture framed for more than two centuries by popular
evangelical commitments, liberalism has little choice, if it is to remain a vital political
option,  but to better understand the historical  specificity of its own ascendancy in a
culture part of whose fundamental narrative it has largely sought to dismiss.
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